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ments could be construed by the casual reader to be unqualified assertions of
therapeutic worth, and that the Commission could order petitioner to rephrase
his advertisement so that this impression would not be created 2 9
Therefore, notwithstanding that an advertisement merely restates what
the book is about, as Commissioner Elman believed to be the case in Rodale,
still the FTC has the power to restrict the publication of the advertisement
should it have a tendency to mislead. Such restriction, although to some ex-
tent inhibitory of freedom of speech and circulation, would not be forbidden
by the First Amendment in view of the major public interest involved. Re-
gardless of the form of an advertisement—that is, whether it be found to
contain expressions of opinion or excerpts from the publication being adver-
tised—the FTC may insist on the most literal truthfulness of such represen-
tations if they are found to create the impression that the ideas and sug-
gestions contained in a publication will unqualifiedly produce a given result.
Such advertisement may be prohibited upon a finding that the results ap-
parently claimed in the advertisement in fact will not occur. While this
result would not effect a ban on legitimate advertising of the publication as
Commissioner Ehnan seemed to fear, it would provide for the protection of
the public from the danger of deceptive advertising in this crucial area.
MARK D. SHUMAN
Government Contracts—Disputes Clause—judicial Review—Extent of
Finality under the Wunderlich Act.—Utah Constr. CI Mining Co. v.
United States.'—Plaintiff had a contract with the Atomic Energy Com-
mission for construction of an assembly facility. Plaintiff made various claims
against the government for increased costs and for damages, some of which
claims arose under the contract, and some of which arose on alleged breaches
of contract. Plaintiff sought administrative decision on these various claims
pursuant to the standard "disputes" clause of the contract. 2
 The Advisory
having discretion to deal with these matters, thinks it best to insist upon a form of
advertising clear enough so that, in the words of the prophet Isaiah 'wayfaring men,
though fools, shall not err therein,' it is not for the courts to revise their judgement."
29
 This decision should be compared with that in Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124
F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1941), where the court of appeals said "the publication, sale and
distribution of matter concerning an article of trade by a person not engaged or
financially interested in commerce in that trade is not an unfair or deceptive act or
practice within the contemplation of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, if
the published matter, even though unfounded or untrue, represents-the publisher's honest
opinion or belief.... Congress did not intend to authorize the Federal Trade Commission
to foreclose expression of honest opinion in the course of one's business of voicing opinion.
The same opinion, however, may become material to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission and enjoinable by it if, wanting in proof or basis in fact, it is utilized
in the trade to mislead or deceive the public. , . ." Id. at 644. Cf. Koch v. FTC, 206
F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1953),
1 339 F.2d 606 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
2 The "disputes" clause involved in Utah read:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this contract, all disputes concerning
questions of fact arising under this contract shall be decided by the contracting
938
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Board on Contract Appeals—AEC affirmed the contracting officer's denial
of the plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff subsequently appealed to the Court of
Claims. A trial commissioner issued an order defining the scope of the
testimony to be taken with reference to the several claims in light of the
Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Bianchi. 3 The Commissioner de-
termined that as to those claims arising under the contract no new evidence
may be submitted, and that the court is confined to the administrative
record. As to those claims based on alleged breaches of the contract it was
determined that new evidence may be introduced. The government appealed
this order to the Court of Claims. 4 HELD: Order affirmed. Facts found by
an administrative board of contract appeals in a dispute under the contract
shall not be binding upon the court in deciding another case based on breach
of contract in which the same facts are involved. 5
The principal case is the latest skirmish in a conflict of views between
the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court of the United States concerning
the nature of judicial review to be accorded Contract Appeals Boards' de-
cisions made under the standard "disputes" clause in government contracts."
officer subject to written appeal by the contractor within 30 days to the head
of the department concerned or his duly authorized representative, whose
decision shall be final and conclusive upon the parties thereto. In the meantime
the contractor shall diligently proceed with the work as directed.
Defendant's Supplementary Memorandum, p. 4.
3 373 U.S. 709 (1963). The holding of this case is discussed in the text infra at note 28.
4 In so doing the government specifically limited the issue involved:
It is not the purpose of the pending proceeding to argue the merits of the
disputes presented, i.e., whether the decisions are final under the Wunderlich
Act. This request for review is solely concerned with establishing that the
disputes are within the ambit of the contractual arbitral procedure, and that
de novo trial proceedings are thereby precluded.
Defendant's Supplementary Memorandum, p. 16.
5 What is meant by the term "binding," is that judicial review is limited to the
administrative record, subject only to the standards set forth in the Wunderlich Act. See
note 11 infra.
6 The current version of the "disputes" clause is worded as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute concerning a
question of fact arising under this contract which is not disposed of by agree-
ment shall be decided by the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his decision
to writing and mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the Contractor.
The decision of the Contracting Officer shall be final and conclusive unless,
within 30 days from the date of receipt of such copy, the Contractor mails or
otherwise furnishes to the Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed to
the Secretary. The decision of the Secretary or his duly authorized representa-
tive for the determination of such appeals shall be final and conclusive unless
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, or
capricious, or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith,
or not supported by substantial evidence. In connection with any appeal pro-
ceeding under this clause, the Contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to
be heard and to offer evidence in support of his appeal. Pending final decision
of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor shall proceed diligently with the
performance of the contract and in accordance with the Contracting Officer's
decision. (b) This "Disputes" clause does not preclude consideration of law
questions in connection with decisions provided for in paragraph (a) above;
provided, that nothing in this contract shall be construed as making final the
939
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Since 1861, a form of disputes procedure has been utilized in govern-
ment contracts as an administrative tool for settlement of government con-
tractors' claims against the United States.? In 1942 the first Board of Con-
tract Appeals was established. 8
 Today there are some fourteen individual
administrative boards established to hear and consider contract appeals. In
some agencies, boards are not established because there is an insufficient
volume of contracts to warrant such a board.° Each of these boards has
separate rules of practice and is autonomous in the rendering of decisions,
subject of course, to review by the Court of Claims or the district courts'°
of the United States on the standards set forth in the Wunderlich Act.' 1
The formality of the hearings before the different boards varies from that
of a round-table conference type of hearing to that approaching a civil
trial before a federal judge without a jury.
Most administrative boards are creatures of statute,' 2
 and judicial re-
view of the determinations of such boards is governed by the Administrative
Procedure Act." However, the authority of the government's contracting
officers and the boards of appeal is not statutory, but is derived solely from
decision of any administrative official, representative, or board on a question
of law.
Miller, Administrative Determination and Judicial Review of Contract Appeals, 4 B.C.
Ind. & Cora. L. Rev. 111 (1963).
7
 Id, at 112-13. The "disputes" clause is mutually beneficial in that the contractor is
not required to litigate every disagreement, and the government is entitled to have him
proceed with the contract while disputes are being resolved on appeal.
8 Spector, Anatomy of a Dispute, 20 Fed. B.J. 398, 399-400 (1960).
9
 Miller, supra note 6, at 116-17.
10
 The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims extends, inter alia, to any claim upon any
express or implied contract involving liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases other
than those involving tort liability. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1958). To relieve congested
dockets of the Court of Claims, Congress granted concurrent jurisdiction to the district
courts of the United States for claims in contracts of less than 510,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1346
(1958). Theoretically then, these tribunals are the arbiters of the rights; liabilities, and
obligations of the parties to government contracts. However, the "disputes" clause
creates an inroad' on this jurisdictional grant in that the practical effect of the clause
is to remove from the jurisdiction of the courts all questions of fact which might arise
under government contracts.
11 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1958):
No provision of any contract entered into by the United States, relating to the
finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the head of any department or
agency or his duly authorized representative or board in a dispute involving
a question arising under such contract, •shall be pleaded in any suit now filed
or to be filed as limiting judicial review of any such decision to cases where
fraud by such official or his said representative or board is alleged: Provided,
however, That any such decision shall be final and conclusive unless the same
is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to
imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence.
68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. § 322 (1958):
No Government contract shall contain a provision making final on a question
of law the decision of any administrative official, representative, or board.
12 See, e.g., 61 Stat. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1958) (NLRB); 35 U.S.C. § 7
(1958) (Patents Board of Appeals) ; 54 Stat. 913 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 17 (1958) (ICC
Boards).
19 60 Stat. 243:(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1952).
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the "disputes" clause in their contracts." Therefore, they are not subject to
the Administrative Procedure Act." The boards are administrative in charac-
ter, however, and their decisions are consistently referred to as such by the
courts. The truth of the matter is that the jurisprudential status of the
administrative boards is a hybrid one, they being neither a court nor an
independent administrative agency.
Due to the "informal" nature of the boards, the Court of Claims has
always had a relatively narrow viewpoint toward their administrative de-
cisions made under "disputes" clauses of standard government contracts."
The Supreme Court, however, has not shared this viewpoint. In United States
v. Moorman,' 7
 the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a contract pro-
vision giving to government officers the power to determine questions of law
under such contract. The difference of opinion between the Court of Claims
and the Supreme Court on the finality to be accorded administrative board
decisions culminated in the well known Wunderlich case." The Supreme
Court in that decision flatly narrowed the judicial review to a single ground:
namely, allegation and proof of actual fraud in the rendering of the decision;
and it defined fraud as "conscious wrongdoing, and intention to cheat or
be dishonest."" The decision expressly invited congressional action if this
standard was too limited. 2°
Three years later Congress accepted the invitation and enacted legisla-
tion for the purpose of overruling the Wunderlich and the Moorman cases.2 '
The first part of this act dealt with the problem of the Wunderlich case, i.e.,
judicial review of an administrative decision as to questions of fact. The sec-
ond part dealt with the problem of the Moorman case, i.e., judicial review
of an administrative decision as to questions of law. In substance, the act
prohibits a contract provision from limiting judicial review of administrative
34
 Utah Constr. & Mining Co. v. United States, supra note 1, at 610.
35
 This led Justice Douglas, dissenting in Bianchi, to comment that: "We are
dealing, in other words, with subnormal administrative procedures," Moreover, Justice
Douglas pointed out that were the Administrative Procedure Act applicable, the
Bianchi decision would have reached the oppositd result. United States v. Bianchi, supra
note 3, at 721.
16
 See, e.g., Vo]entine & Littleton v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 638, 145 F. Supp.
952 (1956); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 126 Ct., Cl. 631
(1953); Wunderlich v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. 92 (1950), rev'd, 342 U.S. 98 (1951);
Moorman v. United States, 113 Ct. CI. 159, 82 F. Supp. 1010 (1949), rev'd, 338 U.S.
457 (1950),
As a further example of the adamancy of the Court of Claims, the procrastination
of the court in recognizing the old "all disputes" clause should be noted. The court
held that it was deprived of its jurisdictional grant to decide legal questions and,
therefore, refused to recognize the clause until twice reversed by the Supreme Court,
once per curiam in United States v. John McShain, Inc., 308 U.S. 520 (1939); and once
unanimously in United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457 (1950).
17 338 U.S. 457 (1950).
18 United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
10 Id. at 100.
20 Justice Minton, speaking for the majority, stated that, "If the standard of
fraud that we adhere to is too limited, that is a matter for Congress." Ibid.
21 It is commonly referred to as the "Wunderlich Act." See note 11 supra. The
statutory intent is specifically set out in 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2191 (1954).
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decisions solely to the "fraud" test, and provides affirmatively that such de-
cisions shall be final and conclusive unless fraudulent, capricious or arbitrary,
grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or if not supported by
substantial evidence. The statute further prohibits "a provision making
final on a question of law the decision of any administrative official, repre-
sentative, or board."22 The Wunderlich Act provided, for the first time, leg-
islation dealing with government contract "disputes" clauses. The courts
were now required to render their decisions on "disputes" clauses in the light
of a statute rather than in the light of judge-made law 2s
Although explicit in setting forth the standard of review to be applied
to board decisions, the Wunderlich statute was not specific as to the nature
of review to be employed by the Court of Claims and the district courts. In
short, the question remained open as to whether the courts were restricted
to review of the administrative record in deciding an appeal from a board
decision or whether the court could review de novo. The lower federal courts
adopted completely opposing views on this question. The district courts had
the numerical weight of authority in holding that review was restricted to
the administrative record.24 A significant minority, led by the Court of
Claims in Valentine & Littleton v. United States, 2"5 took the opposite view.
Thus, the finality provisions regarding the nature of judicial review under the
Wunderlich Act were open to diametrically opposed applications. The dis-
trict courts relied on precedents of the courts of appeals which review de-
cisions of more formal administrative bodies 2Q The Court of Claims, on the
other band, has emphasized the "informality" of procedures of the various
boards of contract appeals. 2 T
22 68 Stat, 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1958).
33 Prior to the Wunderlich Act, the law in the area of judicial review of administra-
tive decisions under the "disputes" clauses was developed and shaped, primarily, by
the Court of Claims. The standards thus developed required that an administrative
decision would not be reviewed by the courts unless the decision was fraudulent, or
arbitrary, or capricious, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith.
Committee on the judiciary, Government Contracts—Finality Clauses, H.R. No. 1380,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1954).
Thus, the congressional purpose of the Wunderlich Act was to substantially restore
the law to the point at which presumably it was before the Supreme Court decisions in
the Moorman and Wunderlich cases,
24 See, e.g., Union Painting Co. v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 803 (D. Alaska 1961);
Allied Paint & Color Works, Inc. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
Wells & Wells, Inc. v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 26 (E.D. Mo. 1958); Mann Chem.
Labs., Inc. v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 563 (D. Mass. 1958).
25 136 Ct. Cl. 638, 145 F. Supp. 952 (1956).
26 In affirming the Wells case, supra note 24, the Court of Appeals, undoubtedly
thinking of its own role in reviewing appeals from the more formal administrative
agencies, held that in reviewing decisions of these agencies, the court is confined to the
record made before such agencies. Wells & Wells, Inc. v. United States, 269 F.2d 412 (8th
Cir. 1959).
27 In Valentine & Littleton, the Court of Claims commented on the abuses of some
administrative boards in deciding cases, particularly, review of documents outside the
record, review in the absence of the parties, and inadequacy of the administrative records
presented on review to the court. Judge Madden stated that:
• The so-called "administrative record" is in many cases a mythical entity. There
is no statutory provision for these administrative decisions or for any procedure
942
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The Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Bianchi 8
 granted
certiorari to resolve this conflict among the lower courts on the important
question of the kind of judicial proceeding to be afforded in cases governed
by the Wunderlich Act. The precise issue before the Court in Bianchi was
a narrow one. It concerned whether, in a suit governed by the Wunderlich
Act, the court is restricted to a review of the administrative record on
issues of fact submitted to administrative determination or is free to receive
new evidence on such issues. The Court stated that:
apart from questions of fraud, determination of the finality to be
attached to a departmental decision on a question arising under a
"disputes" clause must rest solely on consideration of the record
before the department. This conclusion is based both on the lan-
guage of the statute and on its legislative history."
The holding in Bianchi was also narrow, the Court stating that:
We hold only that in its consideration of matters within the scope
of the "disputes" clause in the present case, the Court of Claims
is confined to review of the administrative record under the stand-
ards in the Wunderlich Act and may not receive new evidence."
(Emphasis supplied.)
The reaction of the Court of Claims to the clear mandate laid down
by Bianchi was eagerly awaited by all concerned. Utah is a part of that re-
in making them. The head of the department may make the decision on appeal
personally or may entrust anyone else to make it for him. Whoever makes it has
no power to put witnesses under oath or to compel the attendance of witnesses
or the production of documents. There may or may not be a transcript of the
oral testimony. The deciding officer may, and even in the departments maintain-
ing the most formal procedures, does, search out and consult other documents
which, it occurs to him, would be enlightening, and without regard to the pres-
ence or absence of the claimant.
Valentine & Littleton v. United States, supra note 25, at 641-42, 1.45 F. Supp. at 954.
28 Supra note 3.
2° Id. at 714.
8° Id, at 718. Thus, Bianchi does not decide the scope of the standard "disputes"
agreement in government contracts, beyond the recognition that no argument was ad-
dressed to this question. Id. at 714. Therefore, although the Supreme Court in Bianchi
obviously moved to strengthen, or to encourage the strengthening of the administrative
appellate process for handling contract disputes, the decision provided a limited reply to
the controversial question of the scope of the "disputes" clause.
Presently the scope of the "disputes" clause is dependent upon a "law-fact" test for
determination of the field of responsibility between the administrative boards and the
courts. This "law-fact" distinction is frozen into the "disputes" clause and into the Wun-
derlich Act, thus afflicting the boards and the courts with the unfortunate responsibility
of analyzing these disputes on the basis of the alleged distinction between law and fact.
The distinction between questions of law and fact also arises in the area of administrative
finality and judicial review. The courts, and the Wunderlich Act itself, draw a distinction
between the finality of any decision upon the basis of whether the question involved is
one of law or fact.
This artificial distinction between law and fact in the "disputes" clause area looms
large as being the next "bone of contention" between the Supreme Court and the Court
of Claims.
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action. 31 In Utah the Court of Claims emphasized the essentially contractual
nature of the disputes procedure in reasoning that the board's authority was
limited to disputes "concerning questions of fact arising under this con-
tract."32 The court then went on to state that an action for breach of con-
tract is not within the scope of the clause, and distinguished Bianchi as re-
stricting the court's review to the administrative record only as "to matters
within the scope of the disputes clause.""
Actually, the Utah factual situation does present an issue not directly
covered by the Bianchi holding. Under the Bianchi interpretation of the
Wunderlich Act, finality attaches to a board fact-finding only when that fact-
finding is made within the scope of the board's authority. Assuming the con-
verse of this to be valid, i.e., that finality does not attach to a board's finding
of fact when made outside the scope of the board's authority, the question
remains as to what finality will be given to a fact-finding that has a "dual
aspect"? In other words, what finality should be extended to a finding of fact
made within the scope of authority when that fact also becomes relevant to
a second factual question outside the board's scope of authority? Will the
fact-finding carry the attached finality with it as it crosses the confines of
the board's jurisdiction, or will finality be applied only as the fact relates
to questions within the board's fact-finding authority?
There are three separate points of view as to what degree of finality
will attach to fact-findings made under the administrative board's authority
when they subsequently become relevant to an issue outside the board's
authority.
The first viewpoint is that of the Court of Claims, as exemplified in its
Utah decision. As far back as 1943 the court has treated board fact-findings
relating to questions outside the board's scope of authority as being ad-
visory only and having no binding effect whatsoever. 34
A second viewpoint is that expressed by two recent district court de-
cisions." This viewpoint could well be called a "pragmatic" one. In Allied
Paint & Color Works, Inc. v. United States," plaintiff contractor sued for
alleged breach of contract in the district court. It was plaintiff's contention
31 Another aspect of this reaction may be seen in a case before the Court of Claims
only one month after Bianchi. Despite the apparently clear mandate laid down by Bianchi,
the Court of Claims was determined to have things its own way. In Stein Bros. Mfg. Co.
v. United States, 337 F.2d 861 (Ct. CI. 1963), the Court of Claims expressly said
that it did not regard Bianchi as jurisdictional in the sense that the case held that no new
evidence in addition to the administrative record could be introduced at trial. Confining
Bianchi to its facts as clearly as possible without expressly doing so, the court held for
the contractor on the basis that the government failed to make timely objection to the
new evidence, thus waiving its right to object, whereas such objection had been made in
Bianchi.
32 Utah Constr. & Mining Co. v. United States, supra note I, at 610.
33 Ibid.
34 See, e.g., Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 16;
Miller, Inc. v. United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 252, 77 F. Supp. 209 (1948) ; Silberblatt &
Lasker, Inc. v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 54 (1944); Langevin v. United States, 100 Ct.
Cl. 15 (1943).
85 Allied Paint & Color Works, Inc. v. United States, supra note 24; United States
v. Hamden Co-op. Creamery Co. 185 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
36 Supra note 24.
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that the board's prior findings of fact related to a question of law which was
without the board's jurisdiction. The government maintained that the court
was restricted to the factual record of the board even though the facts were
primarily relevant to an issue beyond the board's authority. The district court
granted the government's motion to preclude the taking of further testimony.
In so doing the court stated:
The Wunderlich Act . . . does not require the district court to try
de novo every case which has run the gamut of the administrative
procedure provided for in the government contract solely because
an issue of law is present. Section 322 merely provides that a de-
cision of an administrative board on a question of law is not final.
... The Court, in this case, must make its independent determina-
tion of the meaning of the contract based upon the evidence ad-
duced before the administrative tribunal. 37
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. In so doing, the court adopted
guidelines set forth in a previous decision.
We agree with the statement by the Court of Appeals ... in Blake
. . . that "a practical approach to the allocation of func-
tions is the guideline" we should follow, but in so resolving the prob-
lem before us we reach the opposite result from the one that court
arrived at in Blake. Here, the issue on which appellant wants the
district court to take additional testimony was squarely presented
to the Contracting Officer and to the Board of Contract Appeals
. . . Since the parties had proceeded through a full hearing before
the Board of Contract Appeals, the district court was quite correct,
under the circumstances here presented, in limiting its review to the
record made before the administrative board?'
The rationale behind this "practical approach" is that although the
fact-finding relates to an issue outside of the board's authority, a full board
hearing was held concerning an issue which the board had special competence
to deal with; and therefore the court should restrict itself to the record in-
sofar as the particular facts are concerned?'
A third approach to the problem is set forth by the dissenting opinion
of Judge Davis in Utah. He urged that "well-supported factual findings,
37
 Id. at 286.
38
 Allied Paint & Color Works, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir.
1962). In Blake Constr. Co. v. United States, 296 F.2d 393 (D.C. Cir. 1961), the case upon
which the Court of Appeals in Allied Paint relied, the "pragmatic" approach was em-
ployed in distinguishing between "fact" and "law" as regards the scope of the "disputes"
clause. See note 30 supra. However, the Court of Appeals in Allied Paint found this
"pragmatic" viewpoint quite useful in determining the extent of finality accorded board
fact-findings under a "disputes" clause.
39
 Cf. United States v. Hamden Co-op. Creamery Co., supra note 35, at 545, where
the district court remarked that "otherwise the hearing before the Board would be rendered
nugatory and constitute a time-consuming nullity providing both parties with two oppor-
tunities to present their case;" and Dobson v. Comm'r, 320 U.S. 489, 502 (1943), wherein
it was stressed that the administrative body in question had a special competence to deal
with the subject matter at issue.
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appropriately made by the board in deciding a dispute 'arising under the con-
tract,' " should be binding in a court trial of a cause of action which is out-
side the "disputes" clause, i.e., outside of the board's scope of authority. 4°
It would seem that the third point of view provides a sounder solution
to the problem presented by Utah. Judge Davis' position on this issue of the
extent of finality of board fact-findings is a logical extension of Bianchi. His
viewpoint provides for the unqualified conclusiveness of any supportable
factual decision by the board within the scope of its authority.41. He felt
that this position was required by (1) the terms of the "disputes" clause, (2)
the phrasing of the Wunderlich Act, (3) the principle underlying the Bianchi
decision, and (4) the policy of collateral estoppel. 42
As the Supreme Court has done since Moorman,43 Judge Davis em-
ployed a literal interpretation of the unambiguous language of the "disputes"
clause.
Once an issue of fact arises in a controversy under the contract
and is decided by the agency, the text of the Disputes clause makes
that decision, if supported, final and conclusive on the parties—not
simply final and conclusive for a special purpose, but final and con-
clusive without qualification and without limitation. 44
Judge Davis also extended this literal interpretation to the Wunderlich
Act and found that " [it] too, is framed in terms of the conclusiveness, with-
out restriction. . . ." He felt that the wording of the act "seem [s] to grant
finality to all factual findings properly made by the board in the course
of resolving a disputed question under the contract" and that this finality
also extended to questions outside the scope of the board's authority.45
Judge Davis then turned to the cornerstone of his viewpoint, the Bianchi
decision. He felt that the Bianchi decision established the "basic rationale"
for accepting completely the clause and the act as they are written." This
"basic rationale" involves
avoidance of "a needless duplication of evidentiary hearings and
a heavy additional burden in the time and expense required to
bring litigation to an end."47
Most important, he felt further that this "basic rationale" is support for
applying unqualified finality to facts validly found by the board in the scope
of its authority. And consequently, "there is no need for a second hearing
on an issue already tried and resolved."48
Judge Davis then pointed out that such a policy of finality is not novel
to the law. This same general policy of avoiding "a second hearing on an
40 Utah Constr. & Mining Co. v. United States, supra note 1, at 617.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
4:3 United States v. Moorman, supra note 17.
44 Utah Constr. & Mining Co. v. United States, supra note 1, at 617.
45 Ibid.





issue already tried and resolved" is the basis for the established doctrine of
collateral estoppel wherein conclusive finality attaches to a judgment in a
prior action when the judgment is relevant to a subsequent adjudication upon
a different cause of action."
The viewpoint expressed by Judge Davis seems to be based upon a
mature consideration of the current nature and operation of the administra-
tive boards. His position is based upon a recognition of the federal policy
of rapid decision that seems implicit in the Wunderlich Act, in light of the
Supreme Court's holding in Bianchi. Although the basic purpose of the act
was to broaden the scope of review after its extreme limitation in United
States v. Wunderlich, the legislative intent includes the desire to maintain
a limited review of the facts. 5°
In contrast, the viewpoint of the Court of Claims appears to be
grounded on a hypersensitive concern over its jurisdictional grant. This
concern is motivated, no doubt, by a feeling that the strong tradition of
judicial recourse demands that good reason be given when access to the
courts is limited or made unavailable, and that due primarily to the "nature
and genesis" of the administrative boards, good reason is lacking. 5 ' However,
it seems that this concern is somewhat unwarranted when it is recognized
that the advantages of a speedy and efficient administrative process for the
settlement of controversies would be vitiated without some limitation on
judicial review. This fact, coupled with the judicial 52 and legislative" trend
toward strengthening and formalizing board procedures makes one feel that
the Court of Claims needs to objectively reevaluate its adamant stand on the
issue of judicial review of administrative board decisions.
At first blush, the second, or "pragmatic" viewpoint—based upon a
feeling that since a board of special competence has made extensive fact-
49 Ibid.
5° 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2191, 2194-95 (1954).
51 Utah Constr. & Mining Co. v. United States, supra note I, at 618. The Court of
Claims is not totally unwarranted in resisting what it considers encroachment upon its
statutory jurisdiction, especially in light of the fact that all other areas excepted from the
court's basic jurisdictional grant are excepted expressly by statute. See note 10 supra.
Furthermore, although it seems that the Court of Claims has gone too far in not recogniz-
ing and giving effect to the implications inherent in the Bianchi decision, it should be
recognized that the Court of Claims has played a major role in development of "disputes"
clause law and procedures. See note 23 supra. In effect, the Court of Claims has been a
"gadfly" in the "disputes" area. Ironically, much of the strengthening and formalizing of
board procedures is due to the recalcitrant attitude of the Court of Claims.
52 United States v. Bianchi, supra note 3.
53 The substantial evidence clause was added to the Wunderlich Act specifically for
the purpose of strengthening board procedures. 2 -U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, supra
note 50, at 2195:
It is believed that if the standard of substantial evidence is adopted this condition
[the lack of opportunity for contractors to become acquainted with all evidence
in support of the government's position] will be corrected and that the records
of hearing officers will hereafter contain all of the testimony and evidence upon
which they have relied in making their decisions. It would not be possible to
justify the retention of the finality [clauses] in Government contracts unless the
hearing procedures were conducted in such a way as to require each party to
present openly its side of the controversy and afford an opportunity of rebuttal.
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findings, review of the board's decision should be limited to the board
record—presents a more flexible middle-ground than that of the Court of
Claims. However, this element of flexibility also presents a good reason
for rejecting a "pragmatic" view in this particular area. The Court of Claims
could, and likely would, employ such a standard to its own decisional
advantage."
Yet, the Court of Claims has not been wholly unjustified in adopting a
restrictive view as to the role of the administrative boards. For one thing,
the status of the boards is not clear. As mentioned previously, they are
neither a court nor an independent agency. Further, there is yet to be an ex-
plicit congressional mandate as to the specific role of the Court of Claims
in this type of judicial review. Instead, the agencies and Congress have
relied on patchwork solutions to specific problems. These makeshift solutions
have failed to provide for a needed uniform procedure in this area of
judicial review.55 Bearing this in mind, it can be seen that more explicit
guidelines are needed than those which a "pragmatic" approach would pro-
vide. The "pragmatic" approach is itself an example of the patchwork solu-
tions made necessary by the lack of a specific mandate as to the nature and
scope of judicial review.
Finally, then, the existing guidelines for judicial review of "disputes"
clause appeals are set forth in the Wunderlich Act. 56 The act, although set-
ting forth specific standards of review, is unclear as to the nature of the re-
view by the courts, i.e., whether the courts are restricted to the administra-
tive record in applying the standards set forth or whether de novo review
may be employed. However, the act, as interpreted by Bianchi, provides
for recognition of the change in the policy of the law as regards the function
and nature of the administrative boards. Moreover, Bianchi articulates the
modern view, embraced by all but the Court of Claims, that, under the
54
 Harrison, Eight Years after Wunderlich—Confusion in the Courts, 28 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 561, 571-72 (1960), poignantly points this out in relating an incident at the
congressional hearings on the Wunderlich legislation:
[Ilt [the Justice Department] expressed the view that the standards "arbitrary"
and "capricious," as contained in the pending bills (and in the ultimate statute),
were unsound. [T]he Department's representative at the . hearing candidly
and precisely enunciated the reason for opposition to these standards, and his
statement is particularly significant because it is probably the closest the legisla-
tive history ever comes to predicting the course the Court of Claims would pur-
sue. The representative] stated: "We would, however, be vigorously opposed
to the employment in such a declaration of such words as 'arbitrary' or 'capri-
cious' . . . . If you use words like 'arbitrary' and 'capricious,' which are com-
pletely devoid of substantive meaning and are indefinite in nature, it will consti-
tute an open invitation to the Court of Claims to do what it has done, despite
the fact that the rule of law was otherwise; that is, to substitute its judgment
for that of the head of the department concerned in any case it felt so inclined."
55 Lidstone and Witte, Administration of Government Contracts: Disputes and
Claims Procedures, 46 Va. L. Rev. 252, 293-94 (1960). The article presents an extremely
thorough examination of the "disputes" clause area and offers valuable and concrete
solutions to three major problems in the area. The solutions place an emphasis on the
need for specific and comprehensive legislation as the means for resolution of the basic
problems in the "disputes" area.
56 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1958). See text quoted supra note 11.
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Wunderlich Act, when the administrative board acts within the scope of its
authority, any fact-finding must be received, if valid, in the same manner
as those of the independent administrative agencies. Therefore, as Judge
Davis urges, where the issue in dispute is one of fact under the contract and
the board has acted within the scope of its authority, it is submitted that
the proper role of the courts is strictly one of review, i.e., limited to the
administrative record unless there is specific evidence of one of the defects
enumerated in the Wunderlich Act.
JOHN H. HINES, JR.
Labor Law—Labor Management Relations Act—Section 8(a) (5)—Re-
fusal of Employer to Bargain in Good Faith.—General Elec. Co. CI
International Union of Elec. Workers, AFL-Cl0. 1—After an unsuccessful
three-week strike against GE following the 1960 national contract negotia-
tions, the IUE filed a complaint with the NLRB that GE had refused to
bargain in good faith during the negotiations and had otherwise acted in
derogation of the lUE's status as bargaining representative. The facts found
by the trial examiner were as follows.
On June 13, 1960, the union presented its offer to the company. Al-
though formal contract negotiations were not to begin until July 19, the
parties had agreed that the early meetings would be negotiating and not
merely review meetings, and would deal with employment-security proposals.
Prior to June 13, in its communications program to employees, GE had,
in effect, committed itself to reject the IUE's employment-security proposals,
and at the meetings merely repeated positions already publicly taken. During
the four weeks of early negotiations, while the union formally presented and
argued its contract demands, GE gave no indication to the union of the em-
ployment-security program it was eventually to include in its offer. The IUE
was thus denied the opportunity to consider and propose alternatives to the
company's program.
As the negotiations proceeded concerning the union's general demands
(other than employment-security proposals), GE continued to maintain that
it was primarily interested in "fact-finding": that is, in listening to the
union's demands and considering them as facts in formulating its own de-
mands. As demonstrated here and throughout the negotiations, GE's position
consistently followed the pattern of Boulwareism, 2
 its own particular ap-
proach to collective bargaining.
1
 150 N.L.R.B. No. 36, 2 Lab. Rel. Rep. (57 L.R.R.M.) 1491 (1964).
2
 Boulwareism, named after its creator, Lemuel R. Boulware, a GE vice-president,
was the result of a reassessment of company-employee relations policies in the aftermath
of strikes in 1946. It was an answer to the concern among GE management that the
power of the unions had been too greatly enhanced during the war.
In practice, GE first seeks through extensive research to determine what is "right"
for its employees in the light of business conditions, competition, economic trends and
employee desires. At the early bargaining sessions, the company listens to the union's
demands and carefully evaluates them in view of its own facts. On the basis of this
evaluation, GE formulates what is "right" and makes an offer to the union. The offer
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